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I noted in a paper published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1983 that at that time,
7 out of the 8 postwar U.S. recessions had been preceded by a sharp increase in the price of
crude petroleum. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to a doubling in the price
of oil in the fall of 1990 and was followed by the ninth postwar recession in 1990-91.T h e
price of oil more than doubled again in 1999-2000, with the tenth postwar recession coming
in 2001. Yet another doubling in the price of oil in 2007-2008 accompanied the beginning
of recession number 11, the most recent and frightening of the postwar economic downturns.
So the count today stands at 10o u to f11, the sole exception being the mild recession of
1960-61 for which there was no preceding rise in oil prices.
Oil shocks could aﬀect the economy through their consequences for both supply and
demand. On the supply side, consider a ﬁrm whose output Y depends on inputs of capital
K, labor N, and energy E:
Y = F(K,N,E).
Suppose that the capital stock is ﬁxed in the short run and that wages adjust instantly to
ensure that labor demand equals a ﬁxed supply N.T h e n i f X denotes the price of energy




















1If the marginal product of energy equals its relative price (∂F/∂E = X),t h e nt h eﬁrst terms









where γ denotes the ﬁrm’s spending on energy relative to the value of its total output.







In other words, the elasticity of output with respect to the relative price of energy would be
the energy expenditure share γ times the price-elasticity of energy demand.
The energy expenditure share is a small number. In 2009, the U.S. consumed about 7.1
billion barrels of petroleum products, which at the current $80/barrel price of crude corre-
sponds to a value around $570 billion. This would represent only 4% of U.S. GDP. Moreover,
the short-run price-elasticity of petroleum demand is extremely small (Dahl, 1993), so that
expression (3) implies an output response substantially below 4%. For this reason, mod-
els built around this kind of mechanism, such as Kim and Loungani (1992), imply that oil
shocks could only have made a small contribution to historical downturns. Note also that
(3) implies a linear relation between y and x; an oil price decrease should increase output by
exactly the same amount that an oil price increase of the same magnitude would decrease
output.
To account for larger eﬀects, it would have to be the case that either K or N also adjust
in response to the oil price shock. Finn (2000) analyzed the multiplier eﬀects that result if
2ﬁrms adjust capital utilization rates in order to minimize depreciation expenses. Leduc and
Sill (2004) incorporated this utilization eﬀect along with labor adjustments resulting from
sticky wages. Again these models imply a linear relation between y and x, though Atkeson
and Kehoe’s (1999) treatment of putty-clay investment technology produces some nonlinear
eﬀects.
Davis (1987a, 1987b) stressed the role of specialized labor and capital in the transmission
mechanism. If the marginal product of labor falls in a particular sector, it can take time
before workers relocate to something more productive, during which transition the economy
will have some unemployed resources. In my 1988 paper, unemployment could result not
just from workers who are in transition between sectors but also from workers who are simply
waiting until conditions in their sector once again improve. In such models, idle labor and
capital rather than decreased energy use as in (1) account for the lost output. Moreover,
these eﬀects are clearly nonlinear. For example when energy prices fell in 1985, some
workers in the oil-producing sector were forced to ﬁnd other jobs. As a result, it is possible
in principle for aggregate output to fall temporarily in response to an oil price decrease just
as it does for an oil price increase.
An alternative mechanism operates through the demand side. An increase in energy
prices leaves consumers with less money to spend on non-energy items and leaves an oil-
importing country with less income overall. If a consumer tries to purchase the same
quantity of energy E in response to an increase in the relative price given by ∆X,t h e n













so that by this mechanism the eﬀect once again is linear and bounded1 by the expenditure
share γ.
Specialization of labor and capital could also be important for the transmission of de-
mand eﬀects as well. Demand for less fuel-eﬃcient cars would be inﬂuenced not just by the
consequences of an oil price increase for current disposable income but also by consideration
of future gasoline prices over the lifetime of the car. Bernanke (1983) noted that uncertainty
per se could lead to a postponement of purchases for capital and durable goods. A shift
in demand away from larger cars seems to have been a key feature of the macroeconomic
response to historical oil shocks (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993; Edelstein and Kilian, 2009;
Hamilton, 2009; Ramey and Vine, 2010), and Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) and Ramey and
Vine (2010) map out in detail exactly how specialization of labor and capital in the U.S.
automobile industry ampliﬁed the eﬀects of historical oil price shocks and introduced nonlin-
earities of the sort anticipated by the sectoral-shifts hypothesis. In the model of Hamilton
(1988), shifts in the advantages between sectors resulting from supply eﬀects (greater pro-
duction costs for sector 1 as a result of higher energy prices) or demand eﬀects (less demand
1 Price adjustment would make this eﬀect smaller whereas the traditional Keynesian multiplier could
make it bigger.
4for the output of sector 1 as a result of higher energy prices) have identical macroeconomic
consequences, operating in either case through idled labor in the disadvantaged sector.
In terms of empirical evidence on nonlinearity, Loungani (1986) demonstrated that oil-
induced sectoral imbalances contributed to ﬂuctuations in U.S. unemployment rates. Mork
(1989) found that oil price increases have diﬀerent predictive implications for subsequent
U.S. GDP growth than oil price decreases. Other studies also reporting evidence that
nonlinear forecasting equations do better include Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995), Balke, Brown,
and Yücel (2002), and Hamilton (1996, 2003). Both Carlton (2010) and Ravazzolo and
Rothman (2010) conﬁrmed these predictive improvements using real-time data. Ferderer
(1996) and Elder and Serletis (2010) demonstrated that oil-price volatility predicts slower
GDP growth, implying that oil price decreases include some contractionary implications.
Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) found nonlinearities in the eﬀects of oil prices on employment
at the individual plant level for U.S. data. Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada (2010) found a
strong nonlinear response of U.S. industrial production to oil prices, with the biggest eﬀects
in industries the use of whose products by consumers is energy intensive. A nonlinear
relation between oil prices and subsequent real GDP growth has also been reported for a
number of OECD countries by Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003), Jiménez-Rodrígueza
and Sánchez (2005), Kim (2009), and Engemann, Kliesen and Owyang (2010).
By contrast, a prominent recent study by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) found little evi-
dence of nonlinearity in the relation between oil prices and U.S. GDP growth. In the next
section I explore why they seem to have reached a diﬀerent conclusion from many of the
5previous researchers mentioned above. Sections 3 and 4 note some of the further implications
of their results for inference about nonlinear dynamic relations.
2 Testing for nonlinearity.
Let yt denote the rate of growth of real GDP, xt the change in the price of oil, and ˜ xt a
proposed known nonlinear function of oil prices. The null hypothesis that the optimal one-
period-ahead forecast of yt is linear in past values of xt−i is quite straightforward to state
and test: we just use OLS to estimate the forecasting regression









γi˜ xt−i + εt (4)
and test whether γ1 = ···= γp =0 . As noted above, a large number of papers have tested
such a hypothesis and rejected it. Kilian and Vigfusson’s paper might leave the impression
that these earlier tests were somehow misspeciﬁed or insuﬃciently powerful, and that the
reason Kilian and Vigfusson reach a diﬀerent conclusion from previous researchers is that
they are proposing superior tests. Such a result would be surprising if true. For Gaussian εt
in (4), OLS produces maximum likelihood estimates which are asymptotically eﬃcient, and
the OLS F test is the likelihood ratio test with well-known desirable properties. That some
new test could be more powerful than the standard OLS test seems unlikely, and certainly
if the OLS test rejects and the new test does not, the reconciliation cannot be based on the
assertion that the new test is more powerful. Kilian and Vigfusson also include in their
analysis some standard OLS tests, which oﬀer further support for their conclusion that the
relation appears to be linear. But insofar as these are the same OLS tests that have already
6produced rejections of the null hypothesis in previous studies, the diﬀerence in conclusions
must come from a diﬀerent data set or diﬀerences in the speciﬁcation of the basic forecasting
regression (4), and not from any superior properties of the new tests proposed in their paper.
Most of their paper explores the case in which ˜ xt is given by x
+
t =m a x {0,x t}, the
alternative hypothesis of interest taken to be that oil price increases have diﬀerent economic
eﬀects from oil price decreases. This particular speciﬁcation is one that previous researchers
have found to be unstable over earlier data sets (e.g., Hooker, 1996; Hamilton, 2003), so
it is unsurprising that Kilian and Vigfusson ﬁnd that such a relation does not perform
well on their sample either. My earlier investigation (Hamilton, 2003) concluded that the
nonlinearities can be captured with a speciﬁcation in which what matters is whether oil
prices make a new 3-year high:
x
#
t =m a x {0,X t − max{Xt−1,...,X t−12}}
for Xt the log level of the oil price. Below I reproduce the coeﬃcients as reported in equation





























If one adds the linear terms {xt−1,x t−2,x t−3,x t−4} to this regression and calculates the OLS








t−4} are zero using the
original data set, the result is a χ2(4) statistic of 16.93, with a p-value of 0.002. The last
entry of Kilian and Vigfusson’s Table 4 reports the OLS χ2 test on a similar speciﬁcation
7for their data set which results in a p-value of 0.046. Clearly it must be diﬀerences in the
speciﬁcation and data set between the two papers, rather than diﬀerences in the testing
methodology, that accounts for the diﬀerent ﬁndings. There are a number of diﬀerences
that could explain the higher p-value obtained by Kilian and Vigfusson.
Diﬀerent data sets. In my earlier analysis, t in (5) ran from 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3 (or
210 total observations), whereas in Kilian and Vigfusson’s analysis, t runs from 1974:Q4 to
2007:Q4 (or 133 total observations). One would expect to see a higher p-value in a shorter
sample, since fewer observations make it harder to reject any hypothesis. In addition, it
is possible that there has been a structural change since 2001, so that the earlier proposed
nonlinear relation (5) does a poorer job with more recent data.
Diﬀerent measure of oil prices. In my original analysis, xt was based on the producer
price index for crude petroleum, whereas Kilian and Vigfusson use the reﬁner acquisition
cost for imported oil. The values of these two measures are compared in the top two
panels of Figure 1. The RAC is not available prior to 1974, and Kilian and Vigfusson
imputed values back to 1971. The two oil price measures are very similar after 1983, but
are somewhat diﬀerent in the 1970s. Most notably, according to RAC, the ﬁrst oil shock of
1974:Q1 was three times the size of that seen in any other quarter of the 1970s, and there
was very little change in oil prices in 1981:Q1. By contrast, the PPI registers the shocks
of 1974:Q1, 1979:Q2-Q3, and 1981:Q1 as similar events. If one thought that a key factor
in the transmission mechanism to the U.S. economy involved the price consumers paid for
gasoline, the PPI may provide a better measure, since the CPI also represents these three
8shocks as having similar magnitude (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). In any case, it is
certainly possible that for such diﬀerent measures of oil prices, the functional form of the
optimal forecast could diﬀer.
Diﬀerent price adjustment. Another diﬀerence is that (5) used for xt the nominal
change in the price of oil, whereas Kilian and Vigfusson subtract the percentage change in
the consumer price index in their deﬁnition of xt. They argue correctly that most economic
theories would involve the real rather than the nominal price of oil. On the other hand, if the
nonlinearity represents threshold responses based on consumer sentiment, it is possible that
these thresholds are deﬁned in nominal terms. I would also note that empirical measurement
of “the” aggregate price level is problematic, and deﬂating by a particular number such as
the CPI introduces a new source of measurement error, which could lead to a deterioration in
the forecasting performance. In any case, it is again quite possible that there are diﬀerences
in the functional form of forecasts based on nominal instead of real prices.
Inclusion of contemporaneous regressors. The χ2 statistics in Kilian and Vig-
fusson’s Table 4 are in fact not based on the forecasting regression (4), but instead come
from testing γ0 = γ1 = ···= γp in









γi˜ xt−i + εt. (6)
Kilian and Vigfusson suggest that this second test would have more power than the ﬁrst,
though again I ﬁnd that an odd claim, since the two regressions are asking diﬀerent questions.
Equation (4) is asking a forecasting question: can GDP growth in quarter t be predicted
on the basis of variables known at the end of quarter t − 1? Equation (6) is estimating
9something else, which perhaps has a structural interpretation for some proposed model of
the economy. If the conditional expectation of yt given current and past oil prices in fact
does not involve the current oil price (so that β0 = γ0 =0 ) , then the two regressions would
be asking the same question. In that case, a test based on (4) would have to be more
powerful since it does not require the estimation and testing of auxiliary parameters whose
true value is in fact zero.
Number of lags. My original regression (5) used p =4lags, whereas Kilian and
Vigfusson have used p =6lags throughout. If the truth is p =4 , estimating and testing the
additional lags will result in a reduction in power. On the other hand, it might be argued
that an optimal linear forecast of yt requires more than 4 lags of yt−i and xt−i,a n dt h a t
omitting the extra lags accounts for the apparent success of a nonlinear speciﬁcation (since
x
#
t−4 incorporates some additional information about xt−i for i>4).
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o no fe a c hf a c t o r . Table 1 identiﬁe st h er o l eo fe a c ho ft h e s ed i ﬀerences
in turn, by changing one element of the speciﬁcation at a time and seeing what eﬀect it
has on the results. The ﬁrst row gives the p-value for the last entry reported in Kilian
and Vigfusson’s Table 4, while the second row gives the p-value for my speciﬁcation on
the original data set. The third row isolates the eﬀe c to ft h ec h o i c eo fs a m p l ep e r i o d
alone, by estimating my original speciﬁcation using the sample period adopted by Kilian
and Vigfusson. Instead of a p-value of 0.002 obtained for the original sample, the p-value is
only 0.013 on the new data set. Is this because the sample is shorter, or because the relation
has changed? One can test for the latter possibility by using data for 1949:Q2-2007:Q4 to re-









were diﬀerent subsequent to 2001:Q4 compared with those prior to 2001:Q4. One fails to
reject the null hypothesis of no change in these coeﬃcients (χ2(4) = 5.03,p=0 .284). Thus
a key explanation for why Kilian and Vigfusson ﬁnd weaker evidence of nonlinearity is that
they have used a shorter sample.
Subsequent rows of Table 1 use Kilian and Vigfusson’s 1974:Q4-2007:Q4 sample, but
change other elements of their speciﬁcation one at a time. Row 4 uses the real change
in the producer price index of crude petroleum in place of the real change in the reﬁner
acquisition cost of imported oil, but otherwise follows Kilian and Vigfusson in all the other
details. Using the PPI instead of the RAC would reduce Kilian and Vigfusson’s reported
p-value from 0.046 to 0.024. Row 5 keeps the RAC, but uses the nominal price rather than
the real. This change alone would again have reduced the p-value from 0.046 to 0.028.
Row 6 simply omits the contemporaneous term, basing the test on (4) rather than (6), and
would be another way to reduce the p-value to 0.027. Finally, row 7 shows that using p =4
instead of p =6would also increase the evidence of nonlinearity. Furthermore, a test of the
null hypothesis that β5 = β6 = γ5 = γ6 =0in Kilian-Vigfusson’s original (6) fails to reject
(χ2(4) = 3.90,p=0 .420), suggesting that this again is another factor in reducing the power
of their tests.
To summarize, Kilian and Vigfusson make a number of changes from previous research,
including a shorter sample, diﬀerent oil price measure, diﬀerent price adjustment, inclusion
of contemporaneous terms, and longer lags. Each of these changes, taken by itself, would
11lead them to ﬁnd weaker evidence of nonlinearity than previous research. Taken together,
they explain why the overall conclusions of their study diﬀer from most earlier investigations.
Post-sample performance. The nonlinear terms in (4) seem to improve the in-sample
ﬁt, but how helpful are they out of sample? If one estimates a purely linear forecasting
equation from the Kilian-Vigfusson 1974:Q3 to 2007:Q4 data set and speciﬁcation,







a n du s e st h e s ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcients to predict the one-quarter-ahead GDP growth over
the data we’ve subsequently received for 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q3, the out-of-sample root-mean-
squared-error is 1.09. On the other hand, when the estimated relation is allowed to include
the Kilian-Vigfusson real RAC net measure x
#
t as in (4), the out-of-sample RMSE is 0.80, a
27% improvement. Interestingly, if one uses the coeﬃcients from (5) as estimated 1949:Q2
to 2001:Q3 to form a post-sample forecast over the period 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q3, the RMSE
is 0.62. These results conﬁrm the impression that nonlinear terms, particularly of the form
I proposed in my 2003 paper, are helpful for forecasting U.S. real GDP growth.
3 Censoring bias.
In Section 2 of their paper, Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) demonstrate that if the true relation
is linear and one mistakenly estimates a nonlinear speciﬁcation, the resulting estimates are
asymptotically biased. These results parallel the demonstration in Hamilton (2003) that
if the true relation is nonlinear and one mistakenly estimates a linear speciﬁcation, the
resulting estimates are asymptotically biased. Both statements are of course true, and are
12illustrations of the broader theme that one runs into problems whenever one tries to estimate
am i s s p e c i ﬁed model.
Kilian and Vigfusson suggest one should take the high road of including both linear and
nonlinear terms as a general strategy to avoid either problem. While that would indeed
work if one had an inﬁnite sample, in practice it is not always better to add more parameters,
particularly in a sample as small as that used by Kilian and Vigfusson. After all, the same
principle would suggest we include both the RAC and PPI as the oil price measure on the
right-hand side, since there is disagreement as to which is the better measure, and nonlinear
transformations of both the real and nominal magnitudes. Nobody would do that, and
nobody should. All empirical research necessarily faces a trade-oﬀ between parsimony and
generality, and one is forced to choose some point on that trade-oﬀ in literally every empirical
study that has ever been done. My personal belief is that there are very strong arguments
for trying to keep the estimated relations parsimonious. I note for example that equation
(5), with 9 estimated parameters, provides a 22% improvement in terms of the out-of-sample
RMSE compared with the 19 parameters required for Kilian and Vigfusson’s (4).
4 On calculating impulse-response functions.
A separate question raised by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009), and one for which I am in full
agreement with their analysis, is how one should calculate impulse-response functions. An
expression like (5) is perfectly appropriate for the purpose of forming a one-quarter-ahead
13forecast. The conditional expectation function,
E(yt|yt−1,x t−1,y t−2,x t−2,...),
is what it is, and if the functional form of this expectation is indeed as proposed in (5),
then OLS should give optimal parameter estimates. However, if one’s goal is to calculate
multi-period-ahead forecasts, such as required by an impulse-response function, Kilian and
Vigfusson are quite correct that there is a problem with the standard approach of simply
adding to (5) a second equation of the form
x
#








diyt−i + ut, (7)
and iterating the one-period-ahead forecasts of the two equations forward assuming iterated
linear projections. The problem comes from the fact that while (5) in such a system would




t |xt−1,y t−1,x t−2,y t−2,...), (8)
since (7) could generate a negative predicted value for x
#
t , w h i c ha no p t i m a lf o r e c a s t( 8 )
would never allow. This point was ﬁrst noted by Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002), though
most researchers have ignored the concern.
Not only is there a problem with applying mechanically the standard linear impulse-
response tools in such a setting as a result of the diﬀerence between (7) and (8), but at a
more fundamental level, researchers need to reﬂect on the underlying question which they are
intending such calculations to answer. A variable such as x
#
t is nonnegative by deﬁnition,
14and therefore the conditional expectation (8) must always be a positive number. Thus if





t |xt−1,y t−1,x t−2,y t−2,...), (9)
then there is a range of positive realizations of x
#
t that are deﬁned to be a “negative oil
shock”. More generally, insofar as an impulse-response function is intended to summarize
the revision in expectations of future variables associated with a particular realization of
(9), as Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1993), Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), and Potter
(2000) emphasized, such an object is potentially diﬀerent for every diﬀerent information set
{xt−1,y t−1,x t−2,y t−2,...} a n ds i z eo ft h es h o c kut. For small shocks, one would expect from
Taylor’s Theorem that a linear representation of the function would be a good approximation
around the point of linearization. Kilian and Vigfusson assume that the researcher is
interested in calculating the consequences of a one-standard-deviation shock averaged over
the history of diﬀerent dates t. For purposes of answering this question, and particularly
given the underlying weak evidence of nonlinearity for their data set and speciﬁcation, they
ﬁnd limited evidence of nonlinearity in the impulse-response function. Notwithstanding,
one could imagine wanting to know the answer to dynamic questions other than this, such
as measuring the implications of a big change in the price of oil occurring at some particular
date of interest. By construction, certain questions of this form would be much more poorly
approximated with a linear function than might be suggested by the summary statistics
reported in their paper.
155 Conclusion.
To me, the evidence is convincing that the relation between GDP growth and oil prices
is nonlinear. The recent paper by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) does not challenge that
conclusion, but does oﬀer a useful reminder that we need to think carefully about what
question we want to ask with an impulse-response function in such a system and cannot rely
on oﬀ-the-shelf linear methods for an answer.
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Table 1 
P-values for test of null hypothesis of linearity for alternative specifications 
 
         sample  oil  measure  price 
adjustment 
contemporaneous #  lags  p-value 
 (1)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  RAC  real  include  6  0.046 
  (2)        1949:Q2-2001:Q3  PPI  nominal  exclude  4  0.002 
 (3)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  PPI nominal  exclude  4 0.013 
 (4)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  PPI  real include  6  0.024 
 (5)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  RAC  nominal  include 6  0.028 
 (6)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  RAC  real  exclude  6 0.027 
 (7)        1974:Q4-2007:Q4  RAC  real  include  4  0.036 
 
Notes to Table 1: P-values for test that  01 0 p γγ γ === = " in equation (6) (for rows with “include” in contemporaneous column) or 
test that  1 0 p γγ === " in equation (4) (for rows with “exclude” in contemporaneous column).  Boldface entries in each row indicate 
those details of the specification that differ from the first row. 22 
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Figure 1. Quarterly percent changes in PPI, RAC, and gasoline CPI.  Third series is 
seasonally adjusted, first two are not. 